United States – Sudan Peace Act


1st Session

H. R. 931
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan. 
March 7, 2001
Mr. TANCREDO (for himself, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. WOLF, Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma, Mr. PITTS, Mr. CAMP, Mr. Evans, Mr. WELDON of Florida, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. MCNULTY, Mr. WHITFIELD, Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky, Ms. RIVERS, Mr. BISHOP, Mrs. TAUSCHER, Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts, Ms. NORTON, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. LAMPSON, Mr. UPTON, Mr. HEFLEY, and Mr. CLEMENT) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,


    This Act may be cited as the ‘Sudan Peace Act’.


    Congress makes the following findings:

  • (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution of the war against areas outside of its control, which has already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000.
  • (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
  • (3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to bring an end to the war.
  • (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
  • (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.
  • (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their population, and internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing the tactic’s effectiveness and human suffering.
  • (7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war through selective starvation and is used to minimize the Government of Sudan’s accountability internationally.
  • (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas outside its control.
  • (9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the United States and other donor countries as a devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government’s control.
  • (10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Government of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
  • (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.
  • (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their populations at increased risk of famine.
  • (13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current international relief operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long term.
  • (14) The ability of populations to defend themselves against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan’s control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the battlefield can be achieved.
  • (15) The United States should use all means of pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan, including–
    • (A) the multilateralization of economic and diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process; 

    (B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside government control;
    (C) continued active support of people-to-people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of government control;
    (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide humanitarian relief to those areas; and
    (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United States and within multilateral institutions toward those ends.


In this Act:

(1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN- The term ‘Government of Sudan’ means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
(2) OLS- The term ‘OLS’ means the United Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and participating relief organizations known as ‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’.


    Congress hereby–

(1) condemns–

  (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict in Sudan;
  (B) the Government of Sudan’s overall human rights record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;
  (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice;
  (D) the Government of Sudan’s use and organization of ‘murahalliin’ or ‘mujahadeen’, Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile regions; and
  (E) aerial bombardment of civilian targets that is sponsored by the Government of Sudan; and

(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.


(a) FINDINGS- Congress hereby recognizes that–

(1) a single viable, internationally and regionally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan; and
(2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994.

(b) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT- The Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the support of–

    • (1) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of Sudan and opposition forces;
    • (2) any necessary peace settlement planning or implementation; and
    • (3) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a peace process in Sudan.


      It is the sense of Congress that–
    • (1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and
    • (2) the President, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should seek to–
      • (A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline Sudan to end the veto power of the Government of Sudan over the plans by Operation Lifeline Sudan for air transport of relief flights and, by doing so, to end the manipulation of the delivery of those relief supplies to the advantage of the Government of Sudan on the battlefield;
      • (B) investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and provide mechanisms for its elimination; and
      • (C) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each time it subjects civilians to aerial bombardment.


    • Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the following:

‘(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections (d) and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall include–

‘(1) a description of the sources and current status of Sudan’s financing and construction of oil exploitation infrastructure and pipelines, the effects on the inhabitants of the oil fields regions of such financing and construction, and the Government of Sudan’s ability to finance the war in Sudan;

‘(2) a description of the extent to which that financing was secured in the United States or with involvement of United States citizens;

‘(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas outside its control, including targets, frequency, and best estimates of damage; and

‘(4) a description of the extent to which humanitarian relief has been obstructed or manipulated by the Government of Sudan or other forces for the purposes of the war in Sudan.’.


    • (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.

(b) REPORT- Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to Congress describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (a).


    • (a) PLAN- The President shall develop a contingency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices if necessary, the greatest possible amount of United States Government and privately donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains and the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions, in the event the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.

(b) REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection (a), the President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for the purposes of the plan.

Last edited 02/28/2001